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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
No United States Supreme Court decision is available to test the ac-
curacy of these conflicting state court decisions. Whether a state can
ratify after rejection, and whether it makes any difference that the rejec-
tion has or has not been certified is still in question. The nearest analogy
is the usually conceded position that ratification is a final and irrevocable
act, whether or not there has been certification, but this is founded upon
Congressional and not judicial interpretation of the Constitution. 9
It is the belief of this commentator that an amendment should remain
open to ratification, so long as the conditions which induced the original
proposal remain the same. A proposed amendment should continue to be
considered until it is adopted or until it is nullified by the passage of more
than a reasonable time under the Dillon v. Gloss rule. So long as conditions
remain the same, a state legislature should be able to reverse its prior act
of ratification or rejection, irrespective of certification. The argument that
a state can withdraw a rejection and not a ratification, because the fifth
article mentions ratification and not rejection seems specious. Equally un-
convincing seems the contention that rejection by more than one-fourth of
the state legislatures terminates the offer. In the absence of judicial con-
struction of the amending procedure, however, these questions will remain
the subject of legal dispute.
W. A. H.
LABoR--NRRis-GuAmrWA ACT-LABOR DISPUTE--[Federal].-The defen-
dant labor union, in order to compel plaintiff employer to recognize the
union and force his employees to become members, carried on an intensive
campaign of propaganda, persuasion, and threats of force. The employer
had no quarrel with his employees, all of whom were satisfied with their
own shop union. When suit for injunction was brought against the union,
it defended upon the ground that the immunities provided for in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act should be granted defendant, since the situation was a
"labor dispute" within the scope of the Act.' Held, that the injunction
should be granted, since there was no "labor dispute" concerning conditions
The conclusion is also based on the fact that Congress declared the 14th
amendment to be adopted, although New Jersey, Ohio and Oregon attempted
to withdraw a prior certified ratification. Conversely the 14th amendment
was rejected by the legislators of N. Carolina, S. Carolina and Georgia but
later ratified by the reorganized government of those states and in each
instance the ratification was treated as authoritative. The Kentucky court
says that this is no basis for saying that ratification can follow rejection,
since the legislatures which rejected were a part of state governments later
declared illegal.
See (1866) 14 Stat. 428; (1867) 15 Stat. '706, 708; (1870) 16 Stat. 1131.
9. See note 8, supra.
1. Norris-LaGuardia Act (1982) 47 Stat. 70, c. 90, 29 U. S. C. A. secs.
101-115. The purpose of the Act is discussed in note (1936) 84 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 771. One of the most recent resumes of the Act is found in note (1937)
2 Mo. L. Rev. 1.
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of employment, nor concerning representation of persons in fixing condi-
tions of employment. 2
The Act provides that a labor dispute shall exist "* * * regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee."3 The question whether a "company-union" employer and
an outside union are "labor disputants" under this broadened definition of
eligible parties under the act has been variously decided. Some courts,
both federal 4 and state,5 in refusing the injunction under circumstances
similar to the instant case, have stressed greatly the fact that the issuance
of the injunction does not now depend upon the employer-employee relation-
ship The courts in these cases apparently reason that the abandonment by
the legislature of the old employer-employee test of a "dispute" means
practically that no injunction should issue unless there is actual violence.
The theory of the instant case however attaches no such significance to the
abandonment of this test. The court here indicated that a bona fide dispute
about working conditions or representatives of the employees must exist
before the parties enjoy the status of "disputants," and that a mere inci-
dental reference by the outside union to working conditions of the company's
employees will be regarded as a sham to hide the real intent of the union,
i. e., to unionize the company shop, a matter which of itself does not, in the
court's opinion, involve any controversy over employment conditions.6
2. Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1937) C. C. H. Lab. Law Serv., par. 16, 404, 5
U. S. Law Week 11.
3. Sec. 113(c) of the Act declares, "The term 'labor dispute' includes
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concern-
ing the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
taining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employ-
ment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee." (Italics supplied.) This last clause
is perhaps one of the most controverted additions over the Clayton Act
(1914) 38 Stat. 730, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 52. The clause purportedly corrects
the law stated in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S.
443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. ed. 349, to the effect that labor injunctions would
be granted unless the relation of the disputants was that of employer-
employee.
4. Federal cases declaring existence of a "labor dispute" even though
none of the plaintiff's employees were union members: Cinderella Theatre
Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union (D. C. Mich. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 164; Dean
v. Mayo (D. C. La. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 459 (injunction granted on amended
bill); Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers' Industrial Union
(D. C. N. J. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 208. Cf. Levering & Garrigues Co. et al. v.
Morrin et al. (C. C. A. 2, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284.
5. For decisions of state courts with same theory, see: Restful Slipper
Co. v. United Shoe & Leather Union (1934) 116 N. J. Eq. 521, 174 Atl.
543; George B. Wallace Co. v. International Association of Mechanics (Ore.
1936) 63 P. (2d) 1090; American Furniture Co. v. I. B. etc. Chauffeurs etc.
General Local No. 200 (1936) 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250, 106 A. L. R.
335; Dr. Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting Station W. C. F. L. (1935) 282
Ill. App. 203.
6. For other cases with restricted view of sec. 113 of the Act, see Lauf
v. Skinner (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 68; Safeway Stores Inc. v. Retail
Clerks' Union (Wash. 1935) 51 P. (2d) 372; Keith Theatre v. Vachon
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The decision of the instant case, therefore, takes the position that the
section of the Act abolishing the employer-employee test is not a "catch-
all" phrase, immunizing labor unions from injunctions in controversies not
concerned with the actual working conditions of employees. What then is
the import of the abolition of that test? Certainly, a discharged employee,
although he is no longer, strictly speaking, an employee of the company,
should have the status of a "disputant" and receive benefit of the Act if
he engages in strike activity for better conditions. 7 Furthermore, the clause
in question should be regarded as complementary to section 13(a) of the
Act, which extends immunity from injunction to persons who are in the
same industry, or who "have direct or indirect interests therein." But, as
the instant case declares, these "interests" must not be fanciful. Indicative
of this restrictive requirement that the parties in interest must be arguing
about matters vital to the laborer, it has even been held that a jurisdic-
tional dispute between two or more opposing unions is not a matter involv-
ing working conditions of employees, and that an injunction will lie at the
suit of the employer who has suffered business injury as a result of a
controversy between the two unions. 8
It is highly desirable that the decisions on this comparatively new legis-
lation should have a high degree of conformity.9 It is to be regretted that
the decisions thus far show no substantial accord as to what constitutes a
"labor dispute."'01 If the courts continue to differ in the interpretation of
(1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692. Cf. United Electric Coal Companies v.
Rice et al. (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 80 F. (2d) 1; Scavenger Service Corp. v.
Courtney et al. (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 825; New Negro Alliance v.
Sanitary Grocery Co. (App. D. C. 1937) C. C. H. Lab. Law Serv., par.
16400.
7. "While out on strike it is not considered that the strikers have aban-
doned their employment, but rather have only ceased from their labor."
Keith Theatre v. Vachon (1936) 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692. See also United
Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia Motion Picture Operators' Union (D. C.
Pa. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 189; Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co.
(C. C. A. 7, 1908) 166 Fed. 45, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 315; American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council (1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42
S. Ct. 72, 66 L. ed. 189, 27 A. L. R. 360. Cf. Alco-Zander Company v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (D. C. Pa. 1929) 35 F. (2d)
203; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell (1918) 245 U. S. 229, 38 S. Ct.
65, 62 L. ed. 260, L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461.
8. United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice (C. C. A. 7, 1935) 80 F. (2d)
1, cert. denied sub. nom. Rice v. United Electric Coal Companies (1936)
297 U. S. 714, 56 S. Ct. 590. For comments on this case, see (1937) 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 1295; (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 1320. Dictum to same effect is found in
In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co. (D. C. Ohio 1935) 11 F. Supp.
198, 205.
9. Several states have legislation similar to the federal Act. Illustrative
of these state acts are: 1933 Colo. Laws, ch. 59; 1935 Md. Laws, ch. 574;
1935 N. Y. Laws, ch. 11, secs. 298, 299, 477; 1937 Pa. Laws, Act No. 308;
1933 Ind. Laws, ch. 12. An example of more limited anti-injunction legisla-
tion is found in Kansas, 1913 Kan. Laws, ch. 233; and in Massachusetts,
1935 Mass. Laws, ch. 407.
10. In Lauf v. Skinner (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 68, the court
declared, in the very face of sec. 113(c) of the Act that a "dispute" con-
1937]
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the Act, additional legislation should be enacted to define more adequately
the term "labor disputant."'"
W. A. E.
SALES-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-STATUS OF CREDITORS UNDER BULK
SALES LAW-[Missouri].-In a recent Missouri case' the plaintiff brought
an action to set aside the sale in bulk of a retail store. Defendant vendor
was indebted to plaintiff on a promissory note. The note had been exe-
cuted by defendant as surety for a co-defendant and had been reduced to
judgment. The note had been given by co-defendant in return for mer-
chandise furnished him by plaintiff. As to the co-defendant, plaintiff was
a merchandise creditor; as to the defendant, plaintiff was adjudged a gen-
eral creditor. Held: affirming decision of trial court, that plaintiff was a
creditor of defendant within the terms of the Bulk Sales Law.2
The question before the court was whether the Bulk Sales Law protects
only those creditors who sell merchandise to merchants for resale, or whether
it extends to all general creditors of the seller3 In two earlier cases in-
volving the same point the Springfield Court of Appeals had expressed
contrary opinions. In the first Missouri case4 the court had favored the
broad view of extending protection to all general creditors of the seller,
but in the later case of Rubenstein v. B'ryson the court had adopted a
limited construction of the term "creditors."s In Roberts V. Kaemmerer,
the only other Missouri decision on the same point, the St. Louis Court of
Appeals, in a well considered opinion, held the Bulk Sales Law extended
cerns only controversies between employer and employee. Accord, Safeway
Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, (1935) 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 322,
arising under statute later declared unconstitutional in Blanchard v. Golden
Age Brewing Co. (Wash. 1936) 63 P. (2d) 397. See criticisms of these
holdings in comments (1937) 31 Ill. L. Rev. 688; (1935) 35 Mich. L. Rev.
340.
11. This difference of interpretation has arisen in spite of the confident
expression of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (S. R. Report 163,
72d Congress, First Session), favorably reporting the bill: "Section 13
of the bill defines various terms used in the act, and it is not believed that
any criticism has been or will be made to these definitions. * * * In order
that the limitation may not be whittled away by refined definitions of what
persons are to be regarded as legitimately involved in labor disputes, the
bill undertakes specifically to designate those persons who are entitled to
invoke the protections of the procedure required."
1. McKnight-Keaton Grocery Co. v. McFadden (Mo. App. 1937) 107
S. W. (2d) 176.
2. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3127-3131.
3. McKnight-Keaton Grocery Co. v. McFadden (Mo. App. 1937) 107
S. W. (2d) 176. For general treatment of subject see 84 A. L. R. 1406;
also 102 A. L. R. 565.
4. Joplin Supply Co. v. Smith (1914) 182 Mo. App. 212, 167 S. W. 649.
5. Rubenstein v. Bryson (Mo. App. 1922) 245 S. W. 585, where the court
held the statute did not apply to a note for a personal debt for family
supplies not intended for resale.
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